By: Dipak Kurmi
The war in Ukraine began unexpectedly on February 24, 2022, catching most of the world off guard. Many analysts believed that it would be an easy victory for Russia, which had already established a successful hybrid war campaign in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine and had annexed Crimea in 2014. The primary reason for Russia’s actions was the perceived violation of their “red line,” which was the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO as part of the West’s post-Cold War expansion. The process of incorporating pro-Western elements in Eastern Europe had been ongoing for some time, and Ukraine’s potential inclusion in NATO was seen as a natural progression.
As the first anniversary of the war approaches, there is much to reflect upon. However, this essay only provides a generic commentary on the factors that are influencing the likely outcome of the conflict, including war stamina and the prospects of an early resolution. Further analysis will be necessary to delve deeper into these factors. For those following the ongoing Munich Security Conference, it is important to understand the Russia-Ukraine war from various perspectives.
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While discussions of options are taking place, there seems to be little progress beyond a determination to continue the conflict. The unexpected visit of US President Joe Biden to Kyiv is a symbolic gesture meant to convey a message of intent to continue the war. This show of determination could also serve as leverage in any potential negotiations if proposals for a resolution begin to materialize.
To begin with, NATO’s efforts to contain Russia were excessive and ultimately proved to be a significant mistake. Russia had been weakened between 1991 and 2014, and its ability to push back against NATO’s containment strategy was limited during that time. However, it was inevitable that a pushback would occur at some point, particularly with a leader like Vladimir Putin at the helm. Putin’s belief that he could solely battle Ukraine to prevent NATO’s advancement was naive, as NATO had invested heavily in its strategy to prevent a resurgence of Russia and would undoubtedly fight to support Ukraine in its efforts to weaken or defeat Russia. The pivotal factor in this entire conflict, the first war after the Covid-19 pandemic that affected the entire world, was Russia’s dual fears. The first fear was that it would lose control of its Black Sea ports, which were crucial for its access to the warm waters of significant waterways such as the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. This fear led to the second fear that, without control of these ports, Russia’s ability to be a strategic influencer would be significantly compromised, diminishing its overall national power.
At the beginning of the war, it became evident that the Russian forces were ill-prepared in terms of doctrine, strategy, training, logistics, technology, and leadership. Their reliance on tank forces demonstrated a lack of understanding of the evolving nature of warfare in the region. It wasn’t until later in the conflict that the Russian Air Force began to play a more significant role, with the employment of drones, missiles, and artillery becoming necessary. This was the same army that once believed in using massed artillery barrages, which caused significant damage to China’s PLA and even changed the course of the Ussuri River during an operation in 1969. Russian generals anticipated a swift defeat of the Ukrainian forces and failed to adequately prepare for an extended engagement. Russian infantry lacked the capability to penetrate deeply into Ukrainian territory and were generally limited to establishing firm bases around cities and townships. The Ukrainian forces, fuelled by their nationalism, young charismatic leadership, and with the backing of NATO’s information and network-centric warfare, successfully planted seeds of doubt about Russia’s military capabilities, emphasizing the demographic challenges facing Russia.
Economic sanctions were imposed on Russia with the intention of crippling its economy, particularly its energy trade. Russia believed that these sanctions would force Europe to compromise on its war aims due to a shortage of energy during the winter months. However, these assumptions proved to be incorrect as China and India continued to purchase Russian energy under alternative payment systems, keeping the Russian economy afloat. Europe also managed to secure some energy deals, albeit at higher prices. This serves as an example that traditional methods of conflict restraint are not effective, and the war remains in a state of flux, with the advantage going to the side that takes a new initiative.
On August 29, 2022, Ukraine launched a military counteroffensive, aimed at expelling Russian forces from the southern regions of Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts. The Russian forces were unable to counter this move, leading to a perception of a quick Ukrainian victory. As a result, ammunition, missiles, and logistics were flown in from countries with close ties to NATO, including Pakistan. However, over the last three months, the Russians have launched a strong counteroffensive, employing drones, missiles, and artillery more frequently. This has given the
Russians an apparent advantage, as the Ukrainian side is running low on air resources, tanks, ammunition, and other military supplies. NATO’s indecisiveness regarding resupplying Ukraine with military resources may be perceived by Russia as an opportunity to press its advantage, although there is no confirmation regarding Russia’s resource position.
The ongoing war in Ukraine continues to persist without any clear victor or resolution. Both sides remain entrenched in their positions and seem unwilling to consider a peaceful solution. The lack of progress has led some to suggest that internal pressures on the leadership may be necessary to initiate positive change. However, recent developments have not been encouraging, with the Munich Security Conference failing to yield any positive indicators. Meanwhile, NATO has warned China against providing military aid to Russia, and there are talks of a US-Israel-like security guarantee for Ukraine to protect it from future Russian aggression. However, some argue that this comparison is flawed, as the threats from Palestine or Iran are not comparable to those posed by Russia in the Crimea and Donbass regions.
As the war marks its first anniversary, it appears to be an endless conflict. India, playing the role of a neutral party, has been purchasing energy from Russia while simultaneously advising them to end the war as it would benefit neither side. This has brought a certain level of attention to the situation. There are few individuals or countries with the capacity, credibility, and influence to mediate and initiate a consultative process to end the conflict, and India is one of them. (The writer is a journalist and commentator based in Guwahati, can be reached at dipaknewslive@gmail.com)
